𝚽𝚽𝚽 - 1 - On the Existence and Definition of Truth

Unfortunately, time is coming at a premium these days, as my thesis work is nearing its end and I have papers due and Greek vocabulary to memorize and gigs to work—all in all a hectic time, though I wouldn't trade any of my busy-ness for the world. What's even more is I have other projects floating around in my head that I'm wanting to get started on as soon as I've graduated this May.

All in due time, I suppose.

Thus, in light of my copout post from last month, now is the time I begin to dive a bit deeper into this blogging project. Have I been able to put the time into researching these topics that I would have liked to? Definitely not. But I've been careful to not give myself a time limit on this so as to give me a real chance to be thorough.

Where better to start with my epistemic journey than with what is likely the most fundamental question one can ask: what is truth? Without understanding the nature of truth and, at the very least, obtaining a working definition, it would seem that no other questions could be answered. How else could one ask questions concerning reality if one does not first know what it is that the answer might demonstrate?

Perhaps this seems like an inane question. For some, the answer may be unbearably obvious. But the purpose of this project is to assume as little as possible, even the ostensibly evident, so I will endeavor to answer it anyway. Πάντα δοκιμάζετε.

Ironically, the question “what is truth?” presupposes that truth exists and is something that can be defined, which are perhaps two even more fundamental propositions, in a sense. After all, wouldn’t it be more basic to ask if truth even exists than to ask what it is?

The reason I’ve foregone such a question is that it is virtually meaningless (and I don’t mean that in a philosophically precise way). To ask the question “does truth exist?” seems to do more than just presuppose some other fundamental propositions, but presupposes the answer itself, as any answer to the question would seem to necessitate that such an answer contain a truth value. If I respond “no,” have I not already committed myself to the existence of truth in believing that very response to be accurate? Truth seems a necessary entailment of reality to me. Even if one were to posit that truth was actually a fiction, that no “truthhood” existed, it seems that such a statement would be operating under the assumption that that proposition was, in fact, true, which would result in incoherency.

But let’s say one yet doubted that “truth” existed (of course, I speak of existence not in the metaphysical sense, but some other sense which I have yet to clarify). Would not even that very doubt of truth’s existence utilize the truth of that which is doubted? In other words, one would be making the statement, “it is true that I doubt that truth exists.” A psychological claim, but a claim nonetheless, and one that appears to have an inescapable truth value.

Could one simply bite the bullet, though, and argue that all speech is meaningless, entailing no truth value so that the proposition, “truth does not exist” is just mindless babble? Again, I cannot fathom how this might elude the conclusion, for even the claim that propositions are meaningless presupposes that such a claim is either true or false.

Redundant, yes, but I warned you I would be relatively thorough. Keyword, relatively. Just imagine how long philosophers have spent on such matters!

So, it seems that “truthhood” and “falsity” are necessary entailments of reality, whatever that reality might be, and however difficult these descriptions may be to ascertain. But what of the second presupposition, that is, that it is something that can be defined? Again, it seems to me that this is something equally as inescapable. Everything that exists, whether it be tangible or conceptual, has certain attributes that differentiate it from other existing things. A dog differs from a cat; a plane differs from a book; Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony differs from Metallica’s For Whom the Bell Tolls. Although these differences may not always be able to be encapsulated by language, it still seems as though the differences are still very present and accessible.

In fact, this principle seems to be the impetus behind the three fundamental laws of logic: the law of identity (A = A), the law of excluded middle (all things are either A or not-A), and the law of non-contradiction (nothing can be both A and not-A). These laws presuppose characteristic boundaries for every existing thing, forming a foundation for rational thought. Thus, if truth exists (as has already been shown), truth must then be able to be defined, even if not articulately. In other words, it must have characteristics that differentiate itself from all other existing things.

Then what is truth? When we say that some proposition P is “true,” what exactly are we conveying?

The most popular answer I’ve heard promulgated throughout my philosophical and theological circles is that truth is that which corresponds to reality. To put it another way, some proposition P is true if that proposition correctly conveys some characteristic concerning that which exists. So, if a person makes the statement, “The Florida Gators is the best NCAA football team,” such could be deemed true because it reflects a fact about reality.

Of course, I’m kidding about my example. Unfortunately, such a proposition would have to be amended before any sort of truth value could be determined (e.g., “The 2020 Florida Gators NCAA football team scored the most passing touchdowns than any other NCAA FBS football team that year”) since “best” is a vague value statement that would have to first be defined (it could be permissible, however, that “best” be defined as “the team which scores the most passing touchdowns in a season,” but I don’t wish to digress too far from the point). Nevertheless, an actual proposition like, “My green Monster can is 6 3/16 inches tall,” would be a true statement, as it does actually convey a truth about reality (I just measured it).

This theory, called the Correspondence Theory, seems to account quite well for what is intuitive to something being called true. Although it sounds tautologous (though, in a way, aren’t all definitions tautologous?), and perhaps mundane or even vague, to say that some true proposition is true by virtue of it being reflective of that which is real appears an adequate definition.

However, as with all fields of philosophy, there is considerable debate over this issue. Other hypotheses are available for one finding fault with the Correspondence Theory. But this seems sufficient for this month, as I have much more thesis-writing to do, and I’d like to research the topic of truth much more over the coming months before moving on from it (I’m especially interested in reading William Alston’s A Realist Conception of Truth and Josh Rasmussen’s Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth at some point in the future). Thus, let’s call it a wrap and expect to get even deeper into the weeds next month!

By way of reminder, this is my first real post, so remember to feel free to interact with my thoughts here. Do you agree? Disagree? Have a question? Perhaps you think there’s something I’ve missed or presupposed that I have yet to challenge? Of course, that’s the awkward part of working from scratch: progress cannot be made without at least making a few assumptions. But, in time, I will try to challenge all of them.

Again, πάντα δοκιμάζετε. Test/examine everything.

Until next time,

Sawyer