Trinity on Trial (A Dialogue with Tre Brickley)

Historically, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity has been considered one of the foundational and uncompromisable teachings of the faith. Many of the early ecumenical councils centered on topics of this nature, deeming as heretical the views contrary to what was considered the orthodox Trinitarian view. Views like Arianism (that Jesus is a created being distinct and subordinate to God the Father), Sabellianism (that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are merely three different modes of God rather than three separate persons [also often called Modalism]), and Adoptionism (that Jesus was a human adopted by God as the Messiah) were all judged by the councils to be in discord with what they believed to be the proper interpretation of the Biblical data. 

As time has trekked on, it has become much more acceptable to challenge what is regarded as the traditional or orthodox positions in Christianity rather than accept them outright by virtue of their lasting prominence. Five hundred years ago started one of the largest movements in this societal shift, properly named the “Reformation,” in which scores of Christians challenged the authority of the Roman Catholic church for providing Scriptural truth, ultimately cutting ties with it. Even now within the relatively disjunct Protestant Christianity, we find further movement away from the Christian status quo. For instance, the traditional “Eternal Conscious Torment” view of Hell has found a recently increasing competition with the Annihilationist and Universalist views, myself being a proponent of the former. And, with this new mindset of questioning tradition, no view has been immune to dissent, including those regarded to be as central as that of the Trinity. 

A Bit of Context

Recently, I have been in discussion with someone who has now become a good friend of mine, Tre Brickley. Tre is a remarkable individual and one whom I admire for his tenacity with respect to his views. He and I initially connected because of our common beliefs on baptism––we both agree that it is normatively essential in order for one to become a Christian. Tre is a Oneness Pentecostal and, naturally, we’ve had some disagreement because of our varying views. Part and parcel with this sect is the view called Unitarianism (the reason for their being called “Oneness”), meaning that he believes the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to all be manifestations of one person, or center of self-consciousness. Though there may be some nuanced differences between the views, this is considered to be under the umbrella of Modalism, but I will try not to assume any baggage with this view apart from what may be a necessary implication of the definition given above. It is from this particular difference of beliefs that we have been consistently engaged in dialogue. 

Throughout my defense, I will sincerely try my best at not misrepresenting your views, Tre. I have no doubt you have nuanced views from what I may discern as the Oneness position, and I’m sure those nuances will come into play as we continue this discussion, so don’t think I am trying to generalize you with the lot of other Unitarian perspectives. In my use of “Unitarian,” I only mean to convey that you believe in a unity of personhood within the Godhead, not that you believe the Son to not be deity as the Wikipedia article for Unitarianism may suggest. If possible, I will avoid making any assumptions or attestations about your position unless particularly germane to an argument I’m making. My goal will simply be to defend the view that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not all one person which, although notably lengthy, will also summarize many points that could easily be expounded upon (maybe we should just write a book together), so I will also expect a graceful interpretation from you in return concerning my view. 

Now, let me first clarify: I am by no means a dogmatic Trinitarian. I am completely open to the possibility of the other competing views. In fact, I would probably consider myself more of a “tentative Trinitarian,” as I do see some other models as extremely viable for reconciling the Biblical data and the more research I do, often the more I see the logic behind certain other views. If Tre (or anyone) were to present Scriptural or philosophical evidence that I sincerely felt to be more convincing than the evidence I have been exposed to for Trinitarianism, then I would be willing to lay aside that view and adopt his. Truth is the ultimate goal here, and I’m fortunate that Tre feels the same way.

Further, I do not view his views as heretical. I welcome Tre as a brother in Christ, even if he happens to view Jesus the Christ and God the Father as the same person. If he is incorrect, I don’t think these views change the fact that Jesus died on the cross, or that our sins are forgiven through Him, or that we have the Holy Spirit living within us. As philosophically and Scripturally awkward as I may perceive the view to be, I see myself as in no position to call his salvation into question because of it (even if he would have been labeled a heretic 1700 years ago). 

As of late, we’ve been at somewhat of a stalemate in the conversation. We both are considerably strong-willed and, at the risk of painting myself in too positive a light, intelligent. With myself being in school, I’ve hardly had the time to dedicate to really confronting his arguments for Unitarianism and objections against Trinitarianism (again, I really am not as dogmatic about this view as the history of Christianity might imply Christians ought to be. Combatting Modalism is simply not one of my major priorities, but I can never turn down an opportunity to debate theology, especially with someone as cordial as Tre). 

Not long ago, our impasse came to a head, as he asked frankly: “Why do you believe God is a trinity of three persons? What is it in Scripture that you think indicate [sic] as much?” Because of a lack of time, I was unable to adequately respond (I recently got married, thank God!), but with the onset of COVID-19, time has been anything but scarce. Therefore, I decided to give him a formal answer in blog form (with his permission) so that I could not only process my own thoughts, but also to have sufficient space to present and defend my arguments. 

Because I am not as dogmatic as some, I want to focus this article more on a critique of Unitarianism rather than as a robust defense of Trinitarianism. I am not as convinced that Trinitarianism is true as much as I am that Unitarianism is false. Thus, my first and foremost endeavor will be to present my case against Tre’s view of Unitarianism. And, I think this will do most of the work in setting up my case for Trinitarianism as well.  If I can demonstrate a demarcation of personhood between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, then I’d need only convince him that the three persons are Divine and that the three persons are unified in essence in order for him to espouse the three major tenets of the view. And, since he already agrees that the Bible clearly explicates the Divinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, while also affirming their unity of essence as a Unitarian, then I ought not require more than to present my multipersonal case.

Before we begin our dialectic, keep in mind that, like most Scriptural cases, most of these arguments are not airtight. My goal is not that I create an inescapable conclusion for Tre, but that I build a case that is simply more convincing. Unitarianism is not a view bereft of Scriptural and scholarly support, and I’d be painting myself into an indefensible theological corner if I tried to set my burden of proof high enough to discredit the whole of that support. I just want to, as he requested, give my Scriptural case for why I believe God to be triune (or at least multipersonal). It’ll be up to him to subsequently eviscerate my arguments...if he can.

To reiterate, the Unitarian view is that Jesus the Christ, God the Father, and the Holy Spirit are all the same person. This means that even if there are separate iterations (i.e., Jesus taking on flesh, the Holy Spirit being within us, the Father speaking aloud), the same self-consciousness is the operating force behind each one. To cite an overused (often polemical) example of this hermeneutic in practice, this position would imply that Jesus, when praying to God in the Garden of Gethsemane (Matt 26:36–46), was actually praying to Himself when reduced down to the simplest parts. There would be no plurality of persons in the Godhead, merely a plurality of manifestations. And thus, I segue into my first argument:

The Tension of Jesus’s Implicit Distinction of Persons

Throughout the New Testament (my focus will be on the NT because I think that’s where both the most pertinent data and my expertise lie) we find presented to us an implied distinction of persons between the Son, the Father, and the Holy Spirit. When talking about and to God the Father, Jesus consistently used either possessive or vocative forms of “Father,” noting a relational difference between the two (i.e., that one is the “Father” and one is the “Son”) (see footnote 1). Additionally, in some passages He shifts between the third and first person when talking about God and Himself to distinguish the two (John 7:17; 12:49). Further, His remarks of and activity with the Holy Spirit seem to also suggest a distinction between them (Matt 12:32; Luke 4:1; 12:10; John 15:26; 16:7). Finally, Jesus baptism presents a very unique instance of an implied distinction, since all three manifestations of the Godhead are present at once and yet still are depicted as seemingly separate from one another (Matt 3:16–17; Luke 3:21–22). These relational and conversational linguistic uses seem to be without substance if the three are not nonidentical persons from one another. 

This is one of my relatively weaker points because I think Tre could escape its conclusions if he pushed for some kind of metaphorical interpretation of these occurrences as I would surmise any Unitarian would be forced to do to avoid the implications. For example, in the popular song by Lit, “My Own Worst Enemy,” the second verse begins with the line, “It's no surprise to me I am my own worst enemy.” This song introduces a metaphorical relational fact in which the same person (presumably the singer) is represented as both the primary agent, and the one acting against the best wishes of that agent. The same could be said of someone who says, “I am my best friend.” Obviously both “I” and “my best friend” are referents to the same person, but he/she is playing two different roles, one real and one metaphorical. This rhetorical maneuver could be postulated of Jesus and God the Father by how they are portrayed in the NT on the Oneness view. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the same person, but the roles and modes they appear in can be completely different for, say, the purpose of salvation. 

My biggest issue with this is that it just seems so counterintuitive and ad hoc. When people refer to other people in relation to themselves, it is almost invariably assumed to be true that the referent is another person. When I say “my wife” or “my friend” or “my father,” I don’t have to explain to others that I am referring to a person that isn’t myself in order to make my purpose clear. The rare instances in which someone refers to his-/herself in a relational sense often involve a pronoun disagreement with the relationship (as in the aforementioned example above) where the obvious subject is “I” and not someone else, thus leaving little room for misinterpretation. Nevertheless, there are situations where one may use an agreeing pronoun to the relationship. Imagine someone accused me of being some certain way when angry and I replied, “Yes, he certainly is a rambunctious fellow!” Here, we have the third person pronoun functioning metaphorically to represent a new person because of the different personality I would exhibit when angry. However, even in situations like this, the true referent is obvious within context. So, even in these unique situations where such linguistic tricks would be appropriate, I still think we have very little reason to believe that Jesus’s employment of language implying the Father or the Holy Spirit to be another person to be anything but that: an implying of the Father or the Holy Spirit to be another person. To posit otherwise would result in the rather awkward conclusion that Jesus’s ministry obscured humanity’s concept of God much more than it elucidated it, which I find to be much less plausible than the alternative. 

Locational Distinction

This and the following two arguments (I shall call them the “Distinction” family of arguments) ought to be grouped together, as they pose a challenge to both our views. Therefore, I will save my psuedo-rebuttal until the end of the third. 

In the Gospel of John, Jesus multiply attests to a sort of locational difference between Himself and the Father (John 13:1; 14:12, 28; 16:10, 28; 17:11; 20:17), looking forward to when He could be back in His presence in the manner prior to His incarnation. This phrasing of having to go “to the Father” (πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα) strongly suggests that Jesus is not, in fact, the Father. Otherwise, how could Jesus “go to” the Father if He were the Father? It would be a logical impossibility for the Father to not be where He actually was in the same way. Of course, I’m putting discussions concerning omnipresence aside for the time being, as I think Jesus is not referring to actual geographical location but perhaps something like relational location or the like (though I’m open to persuasion). Independent of my own interpretation of omnipresence, though, this still presents a definitive distinction between the Father and Son that I think must be included in a discussion of these sorts, even if I acknowledge its relative weakness. 

Knowledge Distinction

Unique to Mark’s Gospel is the claim that the Son is among those not possessing a knowledge of the time of what is presumed to be the Second Coming (13:32). Matthew’s does not explicitly acknowledge the Son’s lack of knowledge, but does say that it is the “Father alone” who knows (24:36). That this is a prima facie conflict for either of our views is evident, but for a multipersonist (you heard that term here first, ladies and gentlemen), it would seem the explanatory power is greater to account for this. The plurality of persons provides the individuality that would ostensibly be needed in order to make sense of this knowledge distinction since, otherwise, it would result in the logical incoherence of the self-consciousness both knowing and not knowing. 

Value Distinction

In John 14:28, Jesus makes the claim that “the Father is greater than I am.” Although still an issue on any model, this value variance seems to necessarily imply some kind of distinction of persons. In whatever way Jesus is referring here, it is still logically incoherent to say that the underlying self-consciousness of both the Father and the Son is somehow disequal to Himself. 

This is further supported from the “Sending Christology” found in the Gospel of John. Jesus remarks of being “sent” by the Father around 40 times in John, an idiosyncrasy of his account. He even emphasizes that the one sent is not greater than the one who sent him (John 13:16), which implies what I believe to be an intuitive truth: the one who sends is “greater” than the one who is sent. Again, a non-Unitarian will inevitably have to bring this proposition to cohesion with his/her own view, but I think any non-Unitarian harmonization will ultimately be greater and make better sense than one that tries to remove the nuance of personhood from the discussion. There must be some value distinction, even if it is only one of submission to an equal authority for the purpose of salvation, and said distinction seems to require a separation of persons. 

Finally, likely the most overt example of this value distinction is found in 1 Cor 15:24–28. This excerpt has application in several arguments here, but I want to focus on the fact that there is an obvious value difference given between the Son and the Father. Lucky for us, Paul was a very thoughtful individual and often anticipated objections before they were given. Because of this, he includes as explicit what most authors would have left implicit: that the authority given to Jesus does not include an authority over God the Father. This is further propounded as he delineates that the conclusion of the eschaton will result in the subjection of Christ to God, an occasion of value differentiation that I don’t think could be obtainable were the two not separate persons.

By now, I’m sure Tre is itching in his seat. For all three of these arguments, there remains a plausible way of escape. If one postulated that these three distinctions were not distinctions between Divine persons but rather between the human nature of God and the Divine nature of God, then it would appear to solve the problem at hand. For example, one could propose that the “knowledge distinction” is not meant to be viewed as between the person of Jesus and the person of the Father, but rather as between the human nature of the Christ and the Divine nature (not that the Trinitarian would necessarily adhere to the former without nuance). Tre may be surprised to know that I find this explanation quite reasonable. I think it is a suitable interpretation of these difficult passages, especially given what he would probably affirm as a stronger case for the three being one person, which would be so strong as to warrant an alteration in interpretative approach. Therefore, I do think he is justified in maintaining his belief here, at least at this point in the discussion.

That being said, I don’t think it is any less reasonable to believe that these three distinctions are reflective of true individuality within the Godhead. When Jesus says, “the Father is greater than I am,” is He noting the obvious that His Divine nature is greater than His human nature? Or is He actually making a substantial claim in proposing that He in His human nature is subordinate to the Father who does not have a human nature? The same goes with the knowledge distinction; does Jesus want His listeners to know that His body doesn’t know the day or the hour or that He while in His body doesn’t know. It’s quite the subtle nuance, but I do think it makes a significant impact on how one understands these passages and whether or not they carry the weight that I think they ought to carry. Of course, I’m not trying to be exhaustive with how we ought to interpret these passages, but merely showing that to interpret them as referring to Christ’s body only doesn’t seem to yield any significant information and that any significant meaning would seem to insinuate multiple agents. I will leave it at that for now, and I anticipate Tre’s response to these arguments.

Right Hand of God’s Throne

Overwhelmingly throughout the NT, Jesus is depicted as being at the right hand of God’s throne (Matt 22:44 [Mark 12:36; Luke 20:42]; 26:64 [Mark 14:62; Luke 22:69]; Mark 16:19; Acts 2:33–34; 5:31; 7:55–56; Rom 8:34; Eph 1:20; Col 3:1; Heb 1:3, 13; 8:1; 10:12; 12:2; 1 Pet 3:22), not on it as one would expect of one who shared the same ultimate self-consciousness. In fact, never apart from one Revelation passage (3:21) is Jesus ever explicitly mentioned as seated on God’s throne, and even here it is “with God,” which presumes a boundary of identity (cf. John 1:1). Furthermore, this passage would not in any way be sufficient to be evidence for a Unitarian conclusion, as it suggests that all Christians have the opportunity to sit with Jesus on His throne. In other words, this certifies that not all who sit with Jesus or God on Their respective thrones are necessarily conjunct with either in a Unitarian sense.

Tre and I actually have discussed this point before, and he believes Rev 22:1–5 to be suitable evidence that God and the Lamb are the same person, seated on the same throne, having the same name (this is only part of his argument with this passage; I just want to address this aspect of it since it’s relevant). However, I think this conclusion is mistaken for several reasons. 

First and foremost, we’ve seen that being seated on the same throne does not necessarily imply a unity of personhood (Rev 3:21). Therefore, even if he is right that the correct interpretation is that God and the Lamb are seated upon one throne, I don’t think this is sufficient for his conclusion. In fact, it could just as well be used as evidence for a Trinitarian or Binitarian God in which God is one entity comprising multiple persons. 

Second, the evidence presented above would lend to a very skewed case that Jesus is actually at the right hand of God and not on God’s throne in this unified sense (we’re putting physical terms to the spiritual, but bear with me for the sake of the argument). So, if we were to let the clear interpret the obscure, we would have to find some other way to understand these outlying verses rather than dismiss the whole of NT literature, like that they are indicative of a change in number of the throne’s occupants at a different point in time than the right hand references. To put it another way, it’s not as though we should assume a unity of personhood from these few references if we aren’t willing to assume a bifurcation of personhood from the many right hand references. 

Third, throughout the entire book of Revelation, God and Christ (or the Lamb) are depicted as presumably distinct (similar to the first argument). It seems farfetched to me to conclude that John expected his readers to read God and the Lamb as separate in some way throughout the entire book and then immediately recognize that they were the same person because of one vague reference to them being on the same throne using one name. That John didn’t intend to see God and the Lamb as the same person by virtue of this is made even more clear in that he presents the Lamb as not seated on God’s throne explicitly in other places throughout the book (Rev 5:13; 6:16; 7:10), making it untenable to maintain that he viewed them as identical.

Finally, we aren’t necessarily forced into believing that the shift to the 3rd person singular or the mention of only one single name is reflective of a unity of personhood between God and the Lamb. Within the context, v. 3 is almost absolutely referencing servants of God the Father (contrary to the NET footnote). The vast majority of uses of the word for servant (δοῦλος) in Revelation are with respect to those of God (1:1 [twice]; 7:3; 11:18; 15:3; 19:2, 5; 22:6; compared to just 2:20 for those of Christ), and God is the agent mentioned immediately after this use (22:5, 6). Not only this, but v. 4 is an obvious reference to several earlier passages in the same book in which God’s name is placed upon the foreheads of His servants alongside the name of the Lamb and the city of the new Jerusalem (3:12; 7:3; 14:1). Viewing 22:4 in light of these earlier passages in which there is a multiplicity of names strengthens the case that 22:4 ought not be viewed so rigidly as to suggest one lone name atop the foreheads of the saints. Instead, we should see v. 4 as no more than a brief focus on God the Father, not an exposé of the unity of the Godhead. Nevertheless, even if one remained unwavering in his/her conviction that the one name provided evidence for a unity of persons, that individual would have to contend with the fact that the name of the new Jerusalem is also not mentioned in 22:4, yet the new Jerusalem is obviously not “God” and should not be perceived as unified with God, which would be the implication. 

Transfer of Authority

This and the following argument (I shall call them the “Transfer” family) seem to me to be much more conclusive in regarding, at the very least, that Jesus and the Father are two separate persons. Jesus expresses several times throughout and after His ministry that His authority was given to Him by the Father (Matt 28:18; John 3:35; 5:27; 13:3; 16:15 17:1–2; Rev 2:28). If this were the case, then how else might a true transfer of authority take place if not between two separate persons? Any supposed transfer could hardly be called a transfer at all if at a foundational level the exact same self-consciousness was both the benefactor and recipient. It seems to me that if one is to maintain the core truth of these passages, a recognition of at least two distinct persons is in order. We wouldn’t accept this Unitarian hypothesis in other pericopes where a transfer of authority is demonstrated (e.g., Matt 10:1; Mark 6:7; Luke 9:1; Rev 2:26; 6:8; 11:3; 20:4), and I don’t think adequate evidence can be given for a special pleading in this case, either.

Transfer of Glory

Like a broken record, the same logic applies to what Jesus also divulges in Scripture as a transfer of glory. John 17:1–5 reveals a change in glory in both directions: a lessening from a previously held glory, and then a restoration of that glory. Jesus is the object to which the transaction occurs and He is depicted as awaiting the glory that comes from the Father. Though describing a separate occasion, the apostle Peter also saw the transfiguration of Jesus as a definitive moment of glorification by the Father to the Son (2 Pet 1:17). Glorification is also described as to take place between the Holy Spirit and the Son, in which the former honors the latter through His duty and compliance (John 16:14). This transfer of glory, like the transfer of authority mentioned prior, intimates a divergence of self-consciousnesses in order for it to be factual. To reiterate, any supposed transfer could hardly be called a transfer at all if at a foundational level the exact same self-consciousness was both the benefactor and recipient. And, this time, it is no longer my intuition we ought to rely on, but the pronouncement of Scripture itself. 

The Hebrews author (my vote is for Luke) tells us in 5:5 that “Christ did not glorify himself in becoming high priest, but the one who glorified him was God”. Here we have cogent argumentation by the Hebrews author in verifying that Jesus was not the active party in His glorification but the passive one in order to demonstrate Christ’s calling by God. In this argument, he seems to assume that God and Christ are two separate persons; otherwise, his argument would fall apart! And, if that wasn’t enough, Jesus plainly states in John 8:54 that His glory is worthless if He is the one doing the glorifying. Along with the corroborating sub-apostolic testimony, Jesus’s words ring expressly true. Therefore, even though a mere transfer of glory would give us the liberty to infer two distinct agents, it appears even Jesus would agree that a real glorification actually requires it.

Potential v. Actual Love

Although much more philosophical in nature, this argument I still think is a very relevant point that ought to be mentioned in this discussion. It is a traditional Christian doctrine that God is omnibenevolent, or all-loving. This is derived from Scriptures such as John 3:16; Rom 5:8; 1 John 4. Hence, William Lane Craig makes the following argument in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 

“So if God is perfectly loving by His very nature, He must be giving Himself in love to another. But who is that other? It cannot be any created person, since creation is a result of God’s free will, not a result of His nature. It belongs to God's very essence to love, but it does not belong to His essence to create. So we can imagine a possible world in which God is perfectly loving and yet no created persons exist. So created persons cannot sufficiently explain whom God loves. . . . It therefore follows that the other to whom God’s love is necessarily directed must be internal to God Himself.

In other words, God is not a single, isolated person, as unitarian forms of theism like Islam hold; rather God is a plurality of persons, as the Christian doctrine of the Trinity affirms. On the unitarian view God is a person who does not give Himself away essentially in love for another; He is focused essentially only on Himself. Hence, He cannot be the most perfect being. But on the Christian view, God is a triad of persons in eternal, self-giving love relationships. Thus, since God is essentially loving, the doctrine of the Trinity is more plausible than any unitarian doctrine of God.” (Quoted from ReasonableFaith.org, Question of the Week #447, excerpt from Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview)

Of course, this does not necessitate a Trinitarian concept of God, but it at least furthers the case against Unitarianism. And I won’t bother tainting Dr. Craig’s words with more of my own. Apostolic Understanding Because of space, I will instead briefly summarize this argument since the breadth of non-Gospel NT writings is quite large to cover in one argument (and I promise I'm trying to be succinct). By and large, this argument can be summed up in the form of a question (sorry, Cameron Bertuzzi): if the proper understanding of God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit is that they are one person, then why is this view not propagated more clearly by the apostles and NT authors? To the contrary, they consistently employ dyadic and triadic formulas (see footnote 2) when they easily could have simplified them into one Being if it was their belief. Of course, this is not irrefutable, but I do believe it is much more sensible to suppose that the NT writers eschewed theological refinement on a doctrine as philosophically intricate as the Trinity than that they overlooked an opportunity to streamline what would have been a much more straightforward explanation as to who Christ was and how His Divinity and unity with God fit in systematically. They were, after all, imbued with the Holy Spirit, whose purpose was to guide the apostles “into all truth” (John 16:13). Therefore, it seems as though more conclusive evidence for such a relatively simple truth that would have brought perspicuity to the early church ought to have been copious rather than the evidence that is present that points to a presumption of distinct persons. Blasphemy In Mark 3:28–29, we have revealed to us the Unforgivable Sin: blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. Again foregoing any hermeneutical concerns, the Markan account is supplemented by both the Matthean (12:31–32) and Lukan (12:10), which contribute a significant detail. Speaking against the Holy Spirit is directly contrasted with “speak[ing] a word against the Son of Man”, noting that such an act is not worthy of being rendered unforgiven. This dissimilarity (and one of the utmost magnitude and practicality) seems to almost unavoidably point to the Holy Spirit and the Son of Man as being two separate persons. Otherwise, how else could the punishments for each be so bifurcated, and to the two most polarized degrees of severity? 

Perhaps one could potentially escape this by postulating that Jesus was referring exclusively to His human form, and I think that is somewhat plausible. But that is just so counterintuitive to me and would create a host of other problems. When “speaking against” someone, one doesn’t merely speak against his/her physical being, but against the core of that person, which is the person, even though the two often are conflated. Yes, one can speak against one’s feet or one’s nose or what have you, but I highly doubt these types of petty denigrations are what Jesus had in mind when He was proscribing blasphemy. This, in my estimation, only leaves the option that one may hypothesize that this is a “they know not what they do” type of scenario where speaking against Jesus is somehow forgivable because of some lack of clarity about His Divinity, but speaking against the Holy Spirit entails some degree of knowledge about His essence as Divine. However, it would appear that one could either lack or possess appropriate knowledge of either person’s Divinity in either blasphemy, so there must yet be some other distinction that Unitarianism lacks the explanatory power for (like that they are simply a duo of individuals).

Testimony

My final argument is the one I believe to be the most powerful. For this one, I feel as though Tre would have to do some serious interpretative maneuvering in order to avoid the conclusion. And, although this maneuvering may indeed be possible, the important question is whether or not it is tenable or, even better, probable. 

This argument centers around John 8:12–18. In this pericope, Jesus is once again facing His Pharisaical adversaries, and they counter Him with an argument not found in the rest of their encounters. “You testify about yourself; your testimony is not true!” they exclaimed, attempting to throw Him off guard. But, of course, this is Jesus we’re talking about here. He calmly retorts, “Even if I testify about myself, my testimony is true, because I know where I came from and where I am going. But you people do not know where I came from or where I am going.” But then He decides to make a lesson out of it: “You people judge by outward appearances; I do not judge anyone. But if I judge, my evaluation is accurate, because I am not alone when I judge, but I and the Father who sent me do so together.” Finally, He brings it home by actually countering their counterargument, “It is written in your law that the testimony of two men is true. I testify about myself and the Father who sent me testifies about me.”

Here, Jesus applies some of the most keen argumentation in the entirety of His documented discussions. The Pharisees accuse Him of bearing an unacceptable testimony since their legal system dictated that a single witness was not enough to establish a legal fact (Deut 19:15). Yes, you can tell they were grasping at some serious straws here. Despite challenging that precedent in John 8:14, Jesus affirms that even under their legal system He still had a sufficient number of witnesses to establish what He was saying as legal fact. And His second witness? God the Father! The entire counterargument Jesus is making is built inseparably on the presupposition that God the Father is a separate person from Himself, and thus capable of functioning as an appropriate second witness. 

Not only this, but Jesus sets the argument up with the claim that He also does not judge alone, but co-judges with the Father. He even stakes the accuracy of His judgment on the sole basis of His not judging alone! This, to me, minimally cries out for a duality of persons between the Father and the Son. So much so, that it would appear to invalidate both the testimony and judgmental accuracy of Jesus if it were not the case. 

Bonus Argument (as some lighthearted fun)

Your name is Tre, which is Swedish, Norwegian, and Italian for "three." Therefore, it is your destiny to become a Trinitarian.

Conclusion

Therefore, from the evidence I’ve presented herein, I believe a significant case has been made for a multiplicity of persons between God and Jesus and perhaps even the Holy Spirit. As a reminder, my primary goal was to respond to the question of what Scriptural evidence I could muster for God being a trinity of three persons. By the arguments I’ve laid out, I think I have adequately answered the question, though with an emphasis on refuting the Unitarian perspective. Thus, I think the reader of God’s word may be quite confident that God the Father and the Holy Spirit are distinct persons from Jesus the Christ, and that we may be reasonably confident that the Holy Spirit is a distinct person from God the Father (perhaps this is a discussion for another time). 

At the beginning, I noted that Tre already believed that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were all Divine and also all one essence by virtue of his Oneness theology. Because of this, I’ve withheld any special attention to defending those points since I think we both agree on them. Admittedly, if I had to choose the weakest tenets of Trinitarianism that Tre could exploit to get me to change my mind, it would be either of these two, but I don’t think Tre will attempt to crack that foundation so I won’t digress any further. As I stated before, I am not as convinced that Trinitarianism is true as much as I am that Unitarianism is false. Hopefully with my excursus here I have laid aside any obstacles Tre had to Trinitarianism so that we may share in a deeper theological unity than that which we do already.

Tre, my apologies for the length here. I know this has been quite a bit to read and digest, not just for you, but for all the readers of this article. It’s been a while since I’ve written to this degree apart from school assignments and so it’s nice to be able to “pleasure-write” again (because we’re just the types of people to consider extravagantly long arguments over theological matters “pleasure-writing”), even if it did divert my attention away from writing a 15-page essay for my Advanced Intro to NT class. 

Nevertheless, this conversation was inevitable, as I feel like we both are fairly passionate in our views and can articulate them well enough to merit a discourse that is much longer than needed. This was meant to be a thorough defense and critique, yet I definitely could have expounded on points had I the time or the appropriate space. I’m certain my list of arguments is not exhaustive either (we hardly even discussed church history!), but hopefully I gave you some points to ponder on for the time being. Perhaps it will be sufficient so as not to demand a rebuttal, but I will prepare for one nonetheless. 

I pray that these words can be both edifying and informative to all those willing to read and ruminate on them. 

I look forward to your response!

1. Matt 7:21; 10:32–33; 11:25–27; 12:50; 15:13; 16:17; 18:10, 19, 35; 20:23; 26:29, 39, 42, 53; Mark 14:36; Luke 2:49; 10:21–22; 22:29, 42; 23:34, 46; 24:49; John 2:16; 5:17–18, 36–37, 43, 45; 6:32, 37, 40, 44–46, 57, 65; 8:16–28, 38, 49, 54; 10:15–18, 25, 29–32, 36–38; 11:41; 12:27–28; 12:49–50; 14:1–31; 15:1, 8–10, 15, 23–26 [“both”]; 16:3, 27–28, 32; 17:1, 5, 11, 21, 24–25; 18:11, 20:17, 21; Acts 1:4; Rev 2:28; 3:5, 21.

2. Acts 13:33; Rom 1:7; 6:4; 15:6; 1 Cor 1:6; 8:6; 15:24; 2 Cor 1:2–3, 21–22; 11:31; 13:14; Gal 1:1, 3; Eph 1:2–3, 17; 4:4–6; 5:20; 6:23; Phil 1:2; 2:11; Col 1:2–3; 3:17; 1 Thess 1:1, 3; 3:11, 13; 2 Thess 1:1–2; 2:16; 1 Tim 1:2; 2 Tim 1:2; Tis 1:4; Phlm 1:3; 1 Pet 1:3, 12; 1 John 1:3; 2:1, 22–24; 4:14; 5:1; 2 John 1:3, 9; Jude 1:1, 20–21; Rev 1:5–6.